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For the most part, the Constitu­tion speaks in generalities. The 14th Amendment, for example, 
instructs the states to provide all per· 
sons the "equal protection of the 
laws." But obviously, this cannot 
mean that states are always forbid­
den from treating a person differently 
than any other person. Children can, 
of course, be constitutionally barred 
from driving, notwithstanding the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
Thus, there is a need within our 
constitutional system to refine the 
Constitution's abstract provisions. 
Otherwise, public officials and the 
people would not know what is per­
mitted and what is forbidden. 
The process of refinement has de­
volved principally (although not ex­
clusively) to the courts. It is the 
courts that have told us that the 
Equal Protection Clause permits the 
states to discriminate on the basis of 
age in issuing driver's licenses, but 
ordinarily does not permit the states 
to treat persons differently on the ba­
sis of their race. 
In distilling abstract constitutional 
provisions into more concrete "deci­
sion rules," courts consider a number 
of factors. One important factor is the 
workability of the decision rules they 
are imposing. Are they comprehensi­
ble? Can they be applied with relative 
ease, predictability and consistency? 
Are they in fact likely to accomplish 
the goals that animate them? 
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A recent Supreme Court 
decision, CO<Yper v. Harris, re­
veals serious workability is­
sues with the decision rules 
governing how state legisla­
tures must treat race and par­
tisan interests when they en­
gage in congressional redis­
tricting. 
Cooper involved constitu­
tional challenges to two North 
Carolina congressional dis­
tricts whose boundaries were 
redrawn following the 2010 
census. 
The court unanimously up­
held a lower court judgment 
concluding that the first dis­
trict had been unconstitution­
ally drawn, and voted 5-3 
(Justice Gorsuch did not par­
ticipate in the case) to affirm 
the lower court's judgment 
that the second district - Dis­
trict 12 - also was unconstitu­
tional. The workability issues 
arise in connection with the 
court's treatment ofDistrict 
12. 
To understand the prob­
lem, one must bear three 
things in mind. 
First, under current 
Supreme Court precedent, a 
state legislature's use of race 
as a "predominant factor" in 
redistricting presumablyvio­
lates the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Second, undercurrent 
Supreme Court precedent, a 
state legislature faces no con­
stitutional limitation on en­
gaging in partisan gerryman­
dering - i.e., intentionally re­
districting so as to maximize 
the power of the controlling 
political party and minimize 
the power of the minority 
party. 
Third, African American 
voters in North Carolina (as 
elsewhere) overwhelmingly 
vote for Democrats. Indeed, 
African American voters in 
North Carolina are more 
likely to vote for Democrats 
than voters who are regis­
tered as Democrats. 
Given these facts, what 
happened in North Carolina 
should come as no surprise. 
The state legislature, which 
was controlled by Republi­
cans following the 2010 cen­
sus, packed a large number of 
African American voters into 
District 12 - a district that 
was already certain to elect a 
Democrat - in order to pre­
vent these voters from partici­
pating in the election of repre­
sentatives from other North 
Carolina congressional dis­
tricts. 
District 12 was challenged 
as unconstitutional on the 
ground that the legislature 
had used race as a predomi­
nant factor in drawing it. The 
state countered with a com­
pletely different characteriza­
tion ofwhat had happened: 
The legislature had done 
nothing more than engage in 
constitutionally permissible 
partisan gerrymandering. 
Yes, the state conceded, 
the legislature had intention­
ally increased the number of 
African American voters in 
District 12 for purposes of di­
luting the impact of their 
votes. But it did not engage in 
this action because of these 
voters' race. Rather, it did so 
because these voters were 
highly likely to vote for 
Democrats. 
As noted above, the lower 
court agreed with the chal­
lengers and held District 12 
unconstitutional. By a 5-3 
vote, a majority of the 
Supreme Court affirmed, 
largely on the ground that the 
record evidence - which con­
tained a number of references 
to race by new District 12's 
architects - supported the 
lower court's finding. 
Justice Alito, writing for 
himself and two others, took 
strong exception to this ruling 
and to the way in which the 
lower court had characterized 
the legislature's conduct. He 
thought that the legislative 
record made it absolutely 
clear that the legislature's 
predominant motive was po­
litical - i.e., "to pack the dis­
trict with Democrats and thus 
to increase the chances of Re­
publican candidates in neigh­
boring districts." 
CO<Yper thus resolved the 
constitutional challenge to 
North Carolina's District 12. 
But it really did not resolve 
the important constitutional 
question raised by the case ­
whether state legislatures en­
gaged in redistricting may in­
tentionally draw district lines 
in ways that impose electoral 
disadvantages on racial 
groups that tend to vote in po­
litically monolithic ways. The 
answer to the question raised 
in CO<Yper should be consis­
tent across the country, re­
gardless ofwhether refer­
ences to race or politics "pre­
dominate" in a given state's 
redistricting record. 
One way that the court 
could deal with the problem 
would be to reconsider its 
hands-off stance with respect 
to whether the Constitution 
imposes limits on partisan 
gerrymandering. Interest­
ingly, a case from Wisconsin 
that is presently making its 
way to the court could set the 
stage for just such a reconsid­
eration. 
I will discuss this case, and 
the court's approach to the 
problem of partisan gerry­
mandering, in my next Consti­
tutional Connections column. 
(John Greabe teaches con­
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